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Abstract 
It is commonly believed that the IPv6 provides greater security against worms by its huge address space. We show 
that a P2P-based worm can exploit the P2P services to spread in the IPv6 Internet. The P2P-based worm applies a 
two-phase scanning mechanism to find targets. The behavior of such a worm in this paper is modeled. We explore via 
analysis and simulation the spread of such worms in an IPv6 Internet. Our results indicate that such a worm can 
exhibit propagation speeds comparable to an IPv4 random-scanning worm. We develop a detailed analytical model 
that reveals the relationship between network parameters and the spreading rate of the worm in an IPv6 world. It is 
also noted that the P2P-based worm may influence the propagation of the worm in the Internet. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the Internet has been plagued by a number of worms [1]. Many of the worms use 
random address scanning to detect vulnerable targets which is one of the most popular mechanisms in 
IPv4 network. This is feasible in the current Internet due to the use of 32-bit addresses, which allow fast-
operating worms to scan the entire address space in a matter of a few hours. The Slammer [2] and Witty 
[3] worms amply demonstrated the effectiveness of this brute force technique in spreading at time scales 
that do not permit human reaction and make automated reaction very difficult. 
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IPv6 offers some interesting differences in respect of the IPv4, which provides end hosts with a large 
address space for truly end-to-end connectivity and with better support for features such as multicast, 
anycast, and mobility [4].It is commonly believed that IPv6 can provide better protection against random 
address scanning worms due to its 128-bit address space for finding a target in an IPv6 Internet will 
increase by approximately 296 , rendering random scanning seemingly prohibitively expensive[5]. 
However, we believe the other more effective strategies can be used to identifying and targeting likely 
targets. Recently, researchers have investigated some feasible method to spread worms in IPv6 network. 
2. Related Work 
Most effective way to overcome the large address space of IPv6 networks is automatically decrease the 
real address space according to the character of the IPv6 addressing architecture. Bellovin and Cheswick 
outlined a number of scanning strategies using in IPv6 network to locate potential target [5]. Kamra et al. 
exploits DNS as a means of identifying potentially vulnerable IPv6 addresses and explored via analysis 
and simulation the spread of worms in an IPv6 Internet [6]. Ting Liu et al. discover that there is serious 
vulnerability in terms of worm propagation in IPv6 and IPv4-IPv6 dual-stack networks [7]. The routing 
worm in IPv6 which acquire subnet prefix of the routable IP addresses through the public information 
from the BGP routing table is simulated by Xu [8]. 
In an IPv6 network, it is easy to locate additional likely targets once one node on the network has been 
infected[5]. Thus, the main obstacle faced by a worm in IPv6 is how to locate valid networks, and at least 
a small number of hosts in those networks. We discovered that there is a serious vulnerability in terms of 
worm propagation in IPv6. A new worm called the P2P-based IPv6 worm is developed and a detailed 
analysis on the impacts of worm propagation in IPv6. 
P2P-based worm propagation can be one of the best facilitators for IPv6 worm attacks due to the 
following reasons; (1) compromising P2P systems with a large number of hosts. (2) since hosts in P2P 
systems maintain a certain number of neighbors for routing purposes, worm infected hosts in the P2P 
system can easily propagate the worm to their neighbors, which continue the worm propagation to other 
hosts and so on;(3) P2P hosts install various application specific software, and any vulnerability in such 
software can enhance their risk of being infected. 
3. P2P-based IPv6 Worm  
The recent surge of P2P applications can be observed. With the development of the IPv6 technique, 
P2P applications are used more and more widely. IPv6 appears as an ideal playground for developing P2P 
applications. MANHASSET, the world’s largest multivendor IPv6 network launches the IPv6 to be used 
as the backbone for network peer-to-peer communications [4]. The P2P application of BitTorrent occupies 
about 61% traffic in the IPv6 network up to date. Therefore, the P2P application will play a more and 
more important role in an IPv6 Internet. 
It is commonly believed that random-scanning worms can barely detect victims in the IPv6 Internet 
and IPv6 subnet with 128-bit and 64-bit address spaces. However, we show that P2P-based worm cannot 
be immune from worms. A P2P-based worm discussed in this paper adopts 2-stage scanning strategy to 
searching for the vulnerable hosts all over the IPv6 address space. The P2P-based worm operates by 
iterating over two steps: a) The worm detects victims in the same IPv6 subnet via multicast-scanning b) 
The worm scan targets in different IPv6 subnets via P2P application. 
3.1. Attack in the subnet in IPv6 Internet 
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There are many more efficient ways to find a host in the local network in IPv6 Internet. Routing 
protocols, Windows service location announcements, neighbor discovery caches, and host configuration 
and log files can be exploited to identify additional hosts on the local network. Algorithm 1 describes the 
attack model in the subnet. 
Algorithm 1: The Attack Model in the Subnet 
Require: node i is the worm infected host in the IPV6 subnet with scan rate s 
1: Send a spurious Router Advertisement to all the hosts in the IPV6 subnet, and get the host-list Lh
from all of Neighbour Solicitation packets 
2: while Lh is not empty do 
3: Select a set V consisted of s victims from L and launch the attack to all hosts in V 
4: Lh=Lh - V 
5: end while
3.2. Attack across the subnet in IPv6 Internet 
In this model, the rich connectivity of P2P systems will be utilized by worms during propagation. After 
a worm infected host joins the P2P system, the host immediately launches the attack on its P2P neighbors 
as a high priority. The logical neighbors may be far away from each other geographically which means the 
neighbors of the P2P system might be in different subnets. Algorithm 2 describes the attack model across 
the different subnet. 
Algorithm 2: The Attack Model in the Different Subnet 
Require: node i be the worm infected host in P2P system with scan rate k 
1: Find all P2P neighbors of node i. Let d neighbors of node i be G={h1; h2; . . . ; 
hd}
2: while G is not empty do 
3:   if k>=d then 
4:      Scan and launch attacks on the d P2P neighbors 
5:      G= NULL 
6:   else
7:     Scan d neighbors in G, i.e., h1; h2; . . . ; hd 
8:     G =G-{h1; h2; . . . ; hd} 
9:   end if
10: end while
4. P2P-Based IPv6 Worm Propagation Model 
The worm has different spreading strategy on the different links which is similar to the biological 
viruses spreading in different species. Therefore, the vulnerable hosts are divided into two species: IPv6-
only hosts and P2P hosts. The IPv6 Internet is assumed to be partitioned into l  groups. Let 
( 1, 2,..., )iD i l=  denote the partition set of address in group i , which has 0iΩ ≥ addresses. The group 
scanning distribution is denoted as the proportion of an infected P2P host scan hitting group i .
4.1. Propagation model of P2P hosts 
Each vulnerable host in P2P hosts could be only found by the infected host with P2P neighbors in IPv6 
Internet. The number of infected hosts in gourp i can be derived by the AAWP model. The number of 
infected P2P hosts in group i at time t is ( )piI t .
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Theorem 1. The number of infected P2P hosts in group i on the next time epoch is represented by 
the following equation in (1), where 
* ( ) ( )g pR p i I t k= .
                                 (1) 
Proof: Since the newly infected P2P hosts will attack all their neighbors immediately.  Then for R 
times attacks, the newly added infected hosts from the susceptible stage to the infected stage can be 
derived by ( ( ))[1 (1 1/ ) ]Rpi pi piN I t− − − Ω . We assumes that an infected P2P hosts can 
generate ( 0)k k > times attacks in time t in the P2P systems, where min( , )k d k= . The number of infected 
P2P hosts at time t is ( )pI t and the probability of an infected P2P hosts scan hitting group i is
* ( )gp i . The 
infected P2P hosts can generate R times attacks in group i at time t, where * ( ) ( )g pR p i I t k= .
4.2. Propagation model of IPv6-only  hosts 
The attack source to IPv6-only vulnerable host in the subnet could be divided into two kinds: P2P 
infected host and IPv6-only infected host. The infected hosts can generate R  times attacks in group i at 
time t where ( ( ) ( ))pi oiR s I t I t= + . The number of infected IPv6-only hosts in group i on the next time epoch is represented by the following equation in (2): 
                              (2)                        
5. Simulation Experiments 
The process of P2P-based worm propagation is simulated by C++ to check the correctness. The 
simulation results show that the P2P-based worm can propagate fast in the IPv6 network. Assumed that 
the P2P-based worm has an initial infected population (0) (0) 10, (0) 0p oI I I= = = , and the scanning 
rate of attacking IPv6-only nodes is 1000s = , and the scanning rate of attacking P2P nodes is 10k = .
The total number of the P2P nodes is 250,0000pΩ = . 360000pN =  is the number of the vulnerable 
P2P hosts. The IPv6 network is distributed into individual groups. 642iΩ = denotes the address space of 
group i , which belongs to one of the 2000 subnets divided from the address space of the IPv6 network.. 
The total number of P2P hosts is 5000, in which there are 500 infected hosts; the number of the IPv6-only 
hosts whose statuses are vulnerable as mentioned before is 1000000.  
Fig. 1 shows the propagation comparison between the P2P-based IPv6 worm in group i and the DNS 
worm in [6]. The P2P-based IPv6 worm could spread much faster than the DNS worm. 
Fig.1 The propagation comparison between P2P-based IPv6 worm and DNS worm 
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Fig.2 shows how the degree affects the speed of the worm propagation. The degree of P2P node is set 
to 5, 10 and 20 respectively and the other factor is the same. The curves denote the infected situation of 
P2P hosts in group i. The simulation results show that the bigger the degree is, the faster the propagation 
speed is.  
Fig.2 worm propagation of different degree in P2P hosts in group i 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we explored via analysis and simulation the spread of P2P-based worms in an IPv6 
Internet. This worm adopts two-phase scanning strategy to detect targets. The multicasting-scanning is 
applied to obtain the address of all IPv6 hosts in the subnet. The P2P-based scan is applied to find targets 
across the subnet. The spreading behaviors are modeled by classifying the hosts into different groups. A 
model is put forward to describe the behavior of the worm’s propagation. The simulation results show that 
the worms can spread effective and faster in the IPv6 Internet. Thus, future IPv6 networks need to shore 
up the security of P2P application to prevent the spread of such worms. 
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